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I.

INTRODUCTION

The right of the people to be free from unreasonable
governmental searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment remains one of the most relevant, and intensely
contested, protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In the post9/11 world, the difficulty of balancing governmental power with
1
individual liberty has become more apparent than ever. It has
become the Supreme Court’s duty to accommodate “these
intensely clashing forces” by defining what constitutes an
unreasonable search or seizure in a particular case, a decision that
ultimately hinges on how the Court interprets the values inherent
2
to the Fourth Amendment’s protections. However, if a state’s
supreme court deems a Fourth Amendment interpretation to be
too restrictive, it is the state’s prerogative to interpret its own
constitution to provide greater individual protection than the
3
Fourth Amendment.
4
In State v. McMurray, the Minnesota Supreme Court had the
opportunity to make such a decision. However, by finding that
there was “no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out
for collection on the side of a public street,” the court held that the
Minnesota Constitution does not provide greater protection than
the Fourth Amendment in the context of warrantless searches of
5
garbage. The majority’s decision ultimately means that police do
not need a warrant, or even a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing,

1. For a detailed analysis of the liberty-security problem after 9/11 in
relation to the Fourth Amendment, see Stephen Holmes, In Case of Emergency:
Misunderstanding Tradeoffs in the War on Terror, 97 CAL. L. REV. 301, 312–32 (2009).
See generally PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE LAW: A
FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 5–8 (2005).
2. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 354 (1974).
3. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967) (“Our holding, of course,
does not affect the State’s power to impose higher standards on searches and
seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.”).
4. 860 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 2015).
5. Id. at 694–95.
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to search through Minnesotans’ garbage left out publicly for
6
pickup.
This case note first explores the history, development, and
construction of constitutional search and seizure law in the United
7
States. It will then discuss the facts of McMurray and examine the
8
reasoning of the majority and dissenting opinions. Next, it analyzes
the court’s decision, arguing that the court erred in accepting the
reasoning of old precedent, which is laden with disturbing privacy
9
and policy implications. Finally, this note concludes that the
decision in State v. McMurray will lead to unconstitutional arrests
and invasions of personal autonomy by the State, as it fails to live
up to the level of protection guaranteed by the Fourth
10
Amendment.
II. HISTORY OF RELEVANT LAW
The tension between maintaining societal order and
protecting individual liberty is so apparent in Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence because the amendment sets the limits for
11
governmental intrusion into people’s private lives. However, as is
the case in much of constitutional interpretation, drawing a clear
line between acceptable and unacceptable government action is
always easier said than done. The tension between competing
values and the difficulty in drawing the line between them is, to a
large extent, the reason why search and seizure law lacks a certain
12
amount of clarity. At different times in its history, the Supreme
Court has felt more pull towards either societal order or civil
liberties. This tension is reflected in the evolution of Fourth
13
Amendment case law. Thus, in order to fully understand where
6. Id.
7. See infra Part II.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See infra Part IV.
10. See infra Part V.
11. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (“The Fourth
Amendment, and the personal rights which it secures, have a long history. At the
very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”).
12. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 349–54 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment is
not clear. The work of giving concrete and contemporary meaning to that brief,
vague, general, unilluminating text written nearly two centuries ago is inescapably
judgmental. In the pans of judgment sit imponderable weights.”).
13. See JOHN WESLEY HALL JR., SEARCH AND SEIZURE 48–49 (4th ed. 2012)
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the Fourth Amendment stands now, one must first understand the
historical context that has so forcefully shaped the path of this
particular constitutional protection.
This section will explain the origins of the Fourth Amendment
and why the founders believed protecting against unreasonable
14
searches and seizures was essential to guard against tyranny. It will
then trace the development of search and seizure law in the United
States, focusing on how the Supreme Court has expanded and
15
constricted the Amendment’s scope under different contexts.
This section will discuss several alternatives for interpreting the
16
Fourth Amendment. Finally, it will explore Minnesota’s place in
all of this: how the Minnesota Supreme Court has treated
warrantless searches of garbage in light of the Fourth
17
Amendment.
A.

Origins of the Fourth Amendment

The Fourth Amendment’s place in the United States
Constitution can be traced directly back to specific abuses by the
British government in the years leading up to the Revolutionary
18
War. In 1696, the British Parliament passed the Act of Frauds,
which gave customs officers in the American colonies the power to
“enter, and go into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse or Room,
or other Place, and in Case of Resistance, to break open Doors,
Chests, Trunks and other Package, there to seize, and from thence
to bring, any Kind of Goods or Merchandize whatsoever,
19
prohibited and uncustomed.” This extensive search and seizure
(“The Supreme Court has said several times that the Fourth Amendment should
be liberally construed to effect the basic rights it guarantees. It now is quite
evident, however, that the opposite is true because the government all too often
gets the benefit of the doubt rather than the citizen.”).
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See infra Part II.D.
18. JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A
STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 19 (1966) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment
provides us with a rich historical background rooted in American, as well as
English, experience; it is the one procedural safeguard in the Constitution that
grew directly out of the events which immediately preceded the revolutionary
struggle with England.”).
19. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE
L.J. 393, 404 (1995) (quoting Act of Frauds of 1662, 12 Car. 2 c.11 § 5(2)(Eng.)).
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power was not exercised consistently until the 1750s, when war with
France prompted England to begin enforcing customs laws even
20
more strictly. Around this time, colonial courts began to issue
writs of assistance, which granted customs officials the very broad
power to search buildings for smuggled goods and compel others
21
to help them do so.
One of the first demonstrations of the colonists’ unhappiness
22
with British rule concerned these writs of assistance. Boston
merchants challenged the writs in a case heard in front of the
23
Superior Court of Boston in 1761. Representing the merchants,
James Otis famously argued that the writs themselves violated the
law because they embodied “the worst instrument of arbitrary
power, the most destructive of English liberty and the fundamental
24
principles of law, that ever was found in an English law-book.” Otis
ultimately lost the casethe writs were upheldbut his arguments
25
became famous across America. The principles at the core of
Otis’s argument“privacy in the home coupled with a fear of
unbridled official discretion”are reflected in search and seizure
26
law today.
After declaring independence, Americans took steps to ensure
that writs of assistance and other abusive search and seizure tactics
would not become a component of their new society by including
provisions in their state constitutions that prohibited unreasonable
27
searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment of the United
20. Id. at 404–05.
21. See id. at 405 (clarifying that the authority these writs confirmed was so
broad because they permitted searches of any place based only on the suspicions
of the customs officer, and they only expired with the death of the king who issued
them).
22. See THOMAS N. MCINNIS, THE EVOLUTION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 18
(2009) (“The colonist’s fear of continued abuse of writs of assistance was behind
one of the first public demonstrations of the colonies’ unhappiness with the
mother country.”).
23. Id.
24. James Otis, Address Before the Superior Court (Feb. 24, 1761),
http://www.constitution.org/bor/otis_against_writs.htm.
25. MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 19 (“Otis and Thatcher may have lost the day,
but their arguments against writs of assistance reverberated across America and
would shortly win the hearts of Americans.”).
26. Stuntz, supra note 19, at 406–07.
27. See Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012
SUP. CT. REV. 67, 70–71 (“In the second half of the eighteenth century, a series of
widely publicized abuses by King George III and his officials led the colonists in
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States Constitution, ratified in 1791, became the national
28
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
29
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In light of the events leading up to ratification, and the fear of
oppressive and arbitrary police power as articulated by James Otis,
the language of the Fourth Amendment reflects the desire of the
American people to preserve their own autonomy and power over
30
their government.
B.

Development of Search and Seizure Law in the United States

One of the most important cases in early Fourth Amendment
interpretation is an eighteenth century English common law case,
31
Entick v. Carrington. John Entick was subjected to a warrant based
32
on charges that he published criticisms of the Crown. The warrant
did not specifically name the subject matter of the search, resulting
33
in government messengers seizing all of his papers. Entick sued
34
the messengers for trespass and won. Upholding the verdict, Lord
Camden grounded his decision in property law, asserting that

the New World to consider a right against unreasonable searches and seizures to
be one of the important rights held against government. That right was articulated
in several state constitutions . . . .”).
28. See MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 19–20 (explaining that the lack of a
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures was one of the major
concerns in ratifying the Federal Constitution).
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. As Justice Jackson has noted, “[O]urs is a government of laws, not of
men, and . . . we submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.” Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
31. Entick v. Carrington [1765] 95 Eng. Rep. 807; see also LANDYNSKI, supra
note 18, at 29–30 (explaining Entick’s considerable influence on the course of U.S.
Fourth Amendment doctrine).
32. See Thomas K. Clancy, What Does the Fourth Amendment Protect? Property,
Privacy, or Security?, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 307, 310–12 (1998) (summarizing
Entick and explaining its role in American Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
33. See id. at 311.
34. See id.
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property rights were sacred and could only be suppressed by laws
passed for the public good:
[O]ur law holds the property of every man so sacred, that
no man can set his foot upon his neighbour’s close
without his leave; if he does he is a trespasser, though he
does no damage at all; if he will tread upon his
35
neighbour’s ground, he must justify it by law.
The Supreme Court relied heavily on Camden’s analysis in
early search and seizure cases, as “[t]he teachings of that great case
were cherished by our statesmen when the Constitution was
36
37
adopted.” Boyd v. United States was the first U.S. case by which the
Supreme Court began formulating the constitutional law of search
38
and seizure. Using Camden’s analysis, the Supreme Court defined
the protections secured by the Fourth Amendment in terms of
property rights, distinguishing searching and seizing stolen or
concealed goods from searching a man’s private books or papers to
39
use as evidence against him. “It is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of
the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of
40
personal security, personal liberty, and private property.” This
marked the beginning of a period characterized by a liberal
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, where the Court, for the
most part, adhered to its principle that “constitutional provisions
for the security of person and property should be liberally
construed” and refused to sanction any search of certain objects, so
41
long as the owner had a protected property interest in them.
35. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (quoting Entick, 95 Eng.
Rep. at 817).
36. United States v. Lefkowtiz, 285 U.S. 452, 466 (1932), abrogated by Harris v.
United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
37. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
38. LANDYNSKI, supra note 18, at 49.
39. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. See generally Morgan Cloud, The Fourth
Amendment During the Lochner Era: Privacy, Property and Liberty in Constitutional
Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 576–79 (1996) (discussing Boyd as an example of early
formalism by the Supreme Court in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence).
40. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630.
41. Id. at 635; see also Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921) (“It
has been repeatedly decided that these amendments should receive a liberal
construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual
depreciation’ of the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts or
by well-intentioned, but mistakenly overzealous, executive officers.”), abrogated by
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 308 (1967).
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In the 1920s, however, the Court began narrowing the scope of
the Fourth Amendment, due in part to the increased pressure to
aid law enforcement in apprehending and convicting criminals
during prohibition, while still conceptualizing search and seizure
42
rights in terms of common law trespass. For example, in Hester v.
United States, the Court ruled that the Fourth Amendment did not
43
cover “open fields” around a person’s home. In Hester, the Court
was asked to decide whether illegal moonshine bottles, discovered
44
without a warrant on Hester’s land, were admissible evidence.
Relying on the common law distinction between a home and open
fields, the Court held that the evidence was admissible by asserting
that the Fourth Amendment did not extend to the area around a
45
home. This literal interpretation of the Fourth Amendment’s text
46
significantly limited its scope.
Olmstead v. United States—another prohibition case—further
narrowed the amendment’s scope when the Court held that
wiretapping “did not amount to a search or seizure within the
47
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” Olmstead had been
48
convicted of “conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act.”
The critical evidence against him was gleaned from wiretapping his
49
office phone line. Because the wiretapping did not involve a
physical trespass or search of tangible effects, the Court again
50
interpreted the Fourth Amendment literally. After Olmstead,
Fourth Amendment protection involved a two-step inquiry to
determine if a trespass had occurred: (1) did the government
intrude on an area protected by the amendment; and (2) if so, did
the intrusion involve a physical invasion that was constitutionally
51
impermissible? In his now famous Olmstead dissent, Justice
42. See MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 263.
43. 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
44. Id. at 57–59.
45. Id. at 59.
46. See MCINNIS, supra note 22, at 27–28 (explaining Hester as the first
narrowing of the Fourth Amendment by the Supreme Court as a part of the
greater context of prohibition).
47. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928).
48. Id. at 455.
49. See id. at 456–57.
50. See id. at 465–66.
51. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND
INTERPRETATION 85–86 (2d ed. 2014) (explaining how Olmstead’s literal
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment fundamentally differed from Boyd and
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Brandeis sought to shift the Fourth Amendment’s focus from the
property interest to the right to personal privacy:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They
recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of
his feelings and of his intellect. . . . They sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions
and their sensations. They conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone—the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable
intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the
individual, whatever the means employed, must be
52
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
However, the Court’s “property-based literalism” dominated
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence until the Court faced another
53
wire-tapping case nearly forty years later.
In 1967, the Court abandoned the property-based approach to
54
search and seizure issues in Katz v. United States by declaring,
55
“[T]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.” Charles
Katz was convicted of transmitting wagering information in
violation of a federal statute based on evidence of his conversation
overheard by FBI agents who had placed a recording device on the
56
outside of a telephone booth. Declining to decide whether the
phone booth was a protected area under Olmstead, the Court
instead shifted its focus to whether Katz sought to preserve the
57
privacy of his conversation. Finding that Katz clearly had
attempted to maintain his privacy, as demonstrated by entering the
58
booth and closing the door, the Court reversed Katz’s conviction.
The legacy of Katz lies primarily in Justice Harlan’s
concurrence, where he proposed a two-part test to determine when
59
a Fourth Amendment search has occurred. First, the individual
limited the Amendment).
52. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53. CLANCY, supra note 51, at 87–89 (“The property-based theories of Boyd
and Olmstead succumbed within months of each other in 1967.”).
54. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
55. Id. at 351–52.
56. See id. at 348.
57. See id. at 352.
58. Id. at 358.
59. See id. at 360–62 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also CLANCY, supra note 51,

10 (Do Not Delete)

362

3/24/2016 7:57 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:353

must have an expectation of privacy for the area or items searched
and, second, the expectation must be one that society recognizes as
60
reasonable. Generally, what a person “knowingly exposes to the
61
public” is not protected by the Fourth Amendment. This test—
and the accompanying privacy-centered focus—continues to be the
62
standard for determining the scope of Fourth Amendment issues.
Fourth Amendment scholars generally agree that Katz was
intended to expand the amendment’s scope by reframing the issue
around individual privacy; however, there is also the sense that Katz
63
has failed to live up to this expectation. “For what ultimately
emerged was an Amendment that was privacy-bound, rising or
falling in both scope and protection based upon how the notion of
64
privacy fared in the Court and within society as a whole.” Under
Harlan’s conceptualization, to successfully invoke the protections
of the Fourth Amendment, a person must not only have a personal
expectation of privacy, but society must also be prepared to respect
65
that expectation. Later courts, faced with technological advances
that allowed less invasive intrusions by the police and increased
pressure to fight crime, have been less inclined to find an

at 92 (“It was Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz that endured.”).
60. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
62. See, e.g., Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S. 56, 64 (1992) (“[P]roperty rights
are not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment violations.”); Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (“[T]his Court uniformly has held that the application of
the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection
can claim a ‘justifiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that
has been invaded by government action.”); Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 591
(1974) (“[I]t is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.”); United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8 (1973) (“Any Fourth Amendment violation in the
present setting must rest on a lawless governmental intrusion upon the privacy of
‘persons’ rather than on interference with ‘property relationships or private
papers.’”).
63. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 385 (“[T]he effect of Katz is to
expand rather than generally to reconstruct the boundaries of fourth amendment
protection.”); John B. Mitchell, What Went Wrong with the Warren Court’s Conception
of the Fourth Amendment?, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 35, 39 (1992) (“The majority in Katz
appeared bent on establishing an expansive view of the Fourth Amendment. The
Amendment was not to be exclusively tied to such property-bound notions as
‘protected areas’ and ‘trespass.’”).
64. Scott E. Sundby, “Everyman”’s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust
Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1758 (1994).
65. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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individual’s expectation of privacy to be reasonable. Instances
where someone knowingly exposed their words or activities to
others, or to the public, have generally been outside the scope of
67
the amendment’s protections. The reasoning being that those
individuals essentially “assume the risk” of their conversations or
activities being overheard or observed by anyone, including the
68
police.
69
For example, in California v. Ciraolo, the Court held that
police using a plane to see into a man’s fenced backyard, without a
70
warrant, was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
Chief Justice Burger admitted the area was within the curtilage of
the home and that Ciraolo expected it to remain private—two
71
fences shielded the entire yard. However, Chief Justice Burger
justified his opinion by focusing on Katz’s holding that what a
person exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not
66. See Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the
Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 SYRACUSE L.
REV. 647, 665 (1988) (“The Katz promise had sowed its own seeds of destruction. It
was no great surprise that a Court increasingly concerned with law and order
would soon begin, under the Katz umbrella, to severely limit the ambit of fourth
amendment privacy.”); see also Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth
Amendment and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1346
(2002) (“By failing to provide any real guidance or substance to the privacy value,
the opinion did not shut the door to examining means, and subsequent decisions
have taken advantage of this opening . . . .”). See generally MCINNIS, supra note 22, at
230–33 (exploring the assumption-of-risk doctrine, separate from the Katz
precedent, which suggests that when individuals undertake the risk that their
information will be exposed to others, they have no legitimate expectation of
privacy).
67. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–44 (1979) (holding that a
defendant’s expectation of privacy in dialed phone numbers was not reasonable
because people generally know that phone companies have access to, and often
keep records of, dialed phone numbers); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435,
442–43 (1976) (holding that people have no reasonable expectation of privacy in
bank records because they are a part of a transaction where information is
voluntarily given to the bank employees); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
752–53 (1971) (holding that the evidence of a police informant who was
electronically “bugged” was admissible because the defendant, by participating in
crime, assumed the risk that one of his partners was an informant).
68. See, e.g., White, 401 U.S. at 752 (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal
activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the
police.”).
69. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
70. See id. at 213–14.
71. See id. at 213.
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protected by the Fourth Amendment, ignoring the other
component of Katz: what a person seeks to preserve as private, even
in an area accessible to the public, might be constitutionally
72
protected.
In California v. Greenwood, the Supreme Court came to a similar
conclusion when it was asked to decide the question of whether the
Fourth Amendment prohibits the warrantless search of garbage left
73
outside for collection. Billy Greenwood was convicted on felony
narcotics charges based on evidence of controlled substances found
74
during a search of his home. The police obtained the warrant to
search Greenwood’s house by first searching his garbage left out on
the curb, which provided enough evidence of narcotics use to get a
75
warrant for the house.
Under Katz, the Fourth Amendment would only be violated if
Greenwood had a subjective expectation of privacy for his garbage
76
that was objectively reasonable. Building off previous decisions,
like Ciraolo, which limited the protections of the Fourth
Amendment if the defendant had exposed her activities to the
public or to third parties, the Court found that no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in garbage left out for pickup because
77
anyone can go through the garbage once it is left out on the curb.
Greenwood set the precedent that a warrantless search of garbage
does not violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States
78
Constitution.
C.

Scholarly Alternatives for Interpreting the Fourth Amendment

Fourth Amendment scholars are, for the most part,
impressively united in their criticism of the Supreme Court’s search
and seizure jurisprudence; the restrictions on individual privacy
imposed by the third party doctrine, and the subsequently
expanded police power, have been met with much frustration and
disapproval, if the variety of scornful law review articles are any
72. See id. at 214–15.
73. 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988).
74. See id. at 37–38.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 39.
77. See id. at 40 (“It is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or
at the side of a public street are readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers,
snoops, and other members of the public.”).
78. Id. at 37.
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79

indication. However, those scholars also vary widely in their
80
proposed alternatives for Fourth Amendment interpretation. For
the sake of time and clarity, this section will explore only three of
the many different proposed alternatives for Fourth Amendment
81
interpretation that are out there. This process is intended to
illuminate some of the problems inherent in the Supreme Court’s
approach, but it will also expose the difficulty that accompanies
devising a coherent and practical method for interpreting and
applying a constitutional provision like the Fourth Amendment.
This section will conclude with a discussion of the underlying
interests and values that are inherent to the protections afforded
82
under the Fourth Amendment.
1.

The Political Fourth Amendment

Professor Thomas Crocker argues that the two dominant
narratives of Fourth Amendment interpretation—protecting
privacy interests and regulating police conduct—overlook the

79. See generally Bruce G. Berner, The Supreme Court and the Fall of the Fourth
Amendment, 25 VAL. U. L. REV. 383, 384 (1991) (“The fourth-amendment ‘reach’
cases are today in wild disarray and the subject of widespread attack.”); Phyllis T.
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth Amendment, 44
VAND. L. REV. 473, 474–75 (1991) (“Current search and seizure doctrine is
inconsistent and incoherent. No one, including the police who are to abide by it,
judges who apply it, or the people who are protected by it, has any meaningful
sense of what the law is.”); Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence:
Fourth and Fifth Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1267, 1269
(1991) (“[T]he Court has abdicated its responsibility to do more than apply fact to
unquestioned law.”); Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment,
35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 201 (1993) (“While questioning the merit of the
Court’s current model, I hope to show that the Court has ignored or distorted the
history of the Fourth Amendment.”); Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A
New Model for Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 584 (1989) (“In the
last decade . . . the Court’s means of promoting law enforcement interests has
tipped the balance unnecessarily further and further away from individual
freedom, significantly diminishing the realm of personal privacy.”).
80. Compare BRUCE A. NEWMAN, AGAINST THAT “POWERFUL ENGINE OF
DESPOTISM” 104–06 (2007) (arguing for a return to the framers’ conception of the
Fourth Amendment, which required warrants to search property and allowed for
warrantless searches in public areas), with STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, MORE ESSENTIAL
THAN EVER: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 177 (proposing
an “adaptive originalism” approach).
81. See infra Parts II.C.1–.3.
82. See infra Part II.C.4.
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83

political purpose of the Fourth Amendment. By only reading the
Fourth Amendment to protect privacy, many aspects of a person’s
everyday social life will not be protected by the Constitution
because they have been exposed to the public, and the Court is
84
unwilling to find an expectation of privacy in them. Combining
these privacy considerations with rules that emphasize effective law
enforcement practices results in a Fourth Amendment doctrine
that “lurches from one consideration to the other, with no
85
overarching guidance.” The solution, Professor Crocker argues, is
to widen the scope of the Fourth Amendment so that it fits in with
86
a broader reading of the Constitution. This wider frame allows us
to see the connections between the First and Fourth Amendments
and “provides a basis for reorienting the Fourth Amendment
narrative around a broader political purpose aimed at protecting
87
liberty.” Focusing on securing people’s rights to political liberty is
essential in this modern era where social media allows us to share
more and more personal information about ourselves, and we
88
increasingly live and operate surrounded by other people. Under
the narrowed Katz framework, the Supreme Court is finding fewer
reasonable expectations of privacy to protect in a society where
89
information is shared so easily. Crocker asserts that Katz was right
to consider the social aspects of life but wrong to “focus solely on
what social expectations thought about personal privacy as a way of
90
regulating police practice.” The solution of using a broader
scope—by viewing the Fourth Amendment as a part of the
Constitution that protects individual’s political liberty—would

83. Thomas P. Crocker, The Political Fourth Amendment, 88 WASH. U. L. REV.
303, 306–08 (2010) (“We face a constitutional dilemma. Either we accept the
existing limited, and increasingly irrelevant, Fourth Amendment protections for
privacy, or we must seek to reinvigorate the Fourth Amendment by seeing how it
functions within a more comprehensive constitutional framework. This Article
argues that the Fourth Amendment makes a distinctive contribution to a broader
constitutional framework aimed at protecting political liberty.” (footnote
omitted)).
84. See id. at 315.
85. Id. at 340.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 341.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 372.
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protect the people in their everyday social practices, something
91
necessary for the functioning of any democracy.
A potential problem with this conceptualization is that while
reframing the scope of the Fourth Amendment to protect political
liberty is a worthwhile objective, Professor Crocker’s proposal lacks
a clear method for differentiating between cases. Similar to the
manipulation of the Supreme Court’s privacy approach, courts
could manipulate the political liberty rhetoric, absent a hard-line
test applied to every case.
2.

The Fourth Amendment’s Right to Exclude

Instead of broadening the Fourth Amendment’s scope to
more adequately protect individual liberty, Professor Thomas
Clancy proposes an analytical structure for the Fourth Amendment
92
that is predicated on an individual’s right to be secure. Explaining
that of the three options available for defining the scope of the
Fourth Amendmentproperty, privacy, or securitythe first two
have proven to be inadequate; the best alternative is to invigorate
the concept of security and the right to exclude to properly
93
conceptualize the values protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Professor Clancy explains that the privacy approach has largely
been eviscerated; despite the Katz Court’s vision for the test to
protect individual interests, later courts have “used privacy analysis
not to expand protected individual interests, but to reduce the
94
scope of the amendment’s protections.” The flaws of this
91. See id. at 378–79.
92. Clancy, supra note 32, at 307–08 (“This article explores the proper
analytical structure by which to measure the meaning of the right to be ‘secure.’
Only by understanding the meaning of the term ‘secure’ is it possible to
determine the scope of the Fourth Amendment’s protections for individuals and,
correlatively, the amount of unregulated governmental power the amendment
allows.”).
93. See id. at 308.
94. Id. at 330–31 (“Reminiscent of the hierarchical approach of property law
theory—where some types of property interests completely barred a search, or the
absence of such an interest barred raising an objection to a search—the Court
created a hierarchy of privacy interests. Expectations of privacy that ‘society is
“prepared to recognize as legitimate”’ have, at least in theory, the greatest
protection; diminished expectations of privacy are more easily invaded; and
subjective expectations of privacy that society is not prepared to recognize as
legitimate have no protection. The Court’s cases rejecting any legitimate
expectation of privacy now comprise a long list of situations.”).
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approach lie in that it has no textual support in the amendment,
and that, because the concept of privacy is so fluid, it is left at the
mercy of the shifting court majorities to decide what privacy means
95
and protects.
Professor Clancy’s solution then is to refer back to the actual
language of the Fourth Amendment and focus on the right of the
96
people to be “secure.” He asserts that to the framers, this security
was from unreasonable government intrusion, specifically granting
individuals the right to exclude the government from interfering
97
with one’s papers, houses, or effects. This right to exclude is
critical; with it, people have the tool to protect themselves against
98
non-justified government intrusions. Of course, with this view,
people only have a right to be secure in what the amendment
99
specifies: their person, houses, papers, or effects. Professor Clancy
explains that this approach will bring considerable clarity to a
murky search and seizure doctrine; if we refer back to the framer’s
focus on security, we can allow individuals the ability to exclude the
government from their person, houses, papers, and effects, thereby
fulfilling the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and simplifying an
100
important component of American society.
95. See id. at 339–40 (“Thus, while a liberal Court substituted privacy in lieu
of property analysis to expand protected interests, a conservative Court has
employed privacy analysis as a vehicle to restrict Fourth Amendment
protections.”).
96. Id. at 357–58 (“Privacy analysis purported to abandon reliance on the
principle of constitutionally protected areas, with Katz asserting that the
amendment protects people, not places. Such a claim simply ignores the language
and structure of the amendment: People have the right to be secure only as to
their persons, houses, papers, and effects.”).
97. Id.
98. See id. at 356 (“In other words, the Fourth Amendment gives the right to
say no to the government’s attempts to search and seize. Privacy, human dignity, a
dislike for the government, and other states of mind may be motivations for
exercising the right to exclude, but they are not synonymous with that right or
with aspects of the right. The right to exclude is the sum and essence of the right
protected. Of course, the right is not absolute. It extends only to protect against
unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
99. Id. at 357.
100. See id. at 368–69 (“This returns the structure of Fourth Amendment
analysis to comport with the intent of the Framers: The people have the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures. By affording citizens the ability to exclude, their security is assured.
That right to be secure is clear and pristine—it is the right to exclude the
government.”).
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One issue this approach generates is that, although focusing
on the Fourth Amendment’s actual languagea person’s right to
be secure in their person, houses, papers, and effectsdoes
provide a more clear methodology in defining what exactly
individuals have the right to exclude the government from, in the
twenty-first century, things like electronically stored information do
not fit neatly within the Fourth Amendment’s eighteenth century
language.
3.

Calling for a New Metaphor: Government-Citizen Trust

Similarly—finding the Fourth Amendment’s focus on privacy
wanting—Professor Scott Sundby argues for a new metaphor to
conceptualize the search and seizure framework—one centered
around the need to restore government-citizen trust rather than
101
simply the “right to be let alone.” Professor Sundby explains that
the “right to be let alone” no longer fulfills the values of the Fourth
Amendment for several reasons, one of them being that in the
modern world, the idea of being left alone seems outdated, at the
102
very least. “Technological and communication advances mean
that much of everyday life is now recorded by someone somewhere
. . . . We may want to be left alone, but we realistically do not expect
103
it to happen in any complete sense.” Professor Sundby does not
have a problem with the concept of privacy being involved in
Fourth Amendment doctrine, but asserts that it should be thought
of as a “cherished principle” rather than how the Court currently
uses it—as a quantifiable fact that helps decide whether there has
104
been a Fourth Amendment intrusion.

101. Sundby, supra note 64, at 1754–55 (“This Article makes an initial effort to
reframe the Fourth Amendment debate by exploring how the Court’s current
metaphor for conceptualizing Fourth Amendment values, Justice Brandeis’s
famous image of ‘the right to be let alone,’ no longer fully captures the values that
are at stake . . . . Drawing upon the values underlying the Constitution and the Bill
of Rights, I suggest that the animating principle which has been ignored in the
current Fourth Amendment debate is the idea of reciprocal government-citizen
trust.”).
102. Id. at 1758–59 (“Perhaps most fundamentally, a Fourth Amendment
based upon expectations of privacy must contend with the changing nature of
modern society. The very notion of a right to be left alone seems a bit tattered
once placed in the context of contemporary life.”).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1760.
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To rectify this problematic framework, Professor Sundby
proposes reimagining the Fourth Amendment’s value in terms of
105
trust between the government and its citizens. The logic is that
the government draws its legitimacy from the trust of the citizens in
electing representatives to govern for them, while the government
must also trust the citizenry to act in accord with laws and societal
106
standards. The “trust that the citizenry will exercise its liberties
responsibly—that implicates the Fourth Amendment and is
jeopardized when the government is allowed to intrude into the
citizenry’s lives without a finding that the citizenry has forfeited
107
society’s trust to exercise its freedoms responsibly.” Professor
Sundby argues that this view will improve Fourth Amendment
doctrine because it will transfer the focus from choosing between
the governmental law enforcement needs and the individual’s
privacy to the “larger context that finds mutual benefits from the
108
Amendment for both the government and the citizen.”
Encouraging the use of a government-citizen trust metaphor
might be a more enlightened way to think about the Fourth
Amendment, but when faced with people who have committed
crimes, or the possibility of preventing crime, it is difficult to
imagine a court always having the inclination to step back and
consider the philosophical nature of the relationship between a
government and its citizens.
4.

Conceptualizing the Fourth: Is There a “Right” Approach?

Analyzing three different alternatives for conceptualizing the
Fourth Amendment law demonstrates the difficulty of approaching
the people’s right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures. Three different legal scholars approach the issue three
different ways, with all of them making astute arguments involving
historical intent, legal and political theory, and social policy. What
these proposed alternatives have in common is that they reflect
their authors’ views on what the Fourth Amendment is really about,
just as any other theory would. Legal principles and authority only
get you so far when the subject of your analysis strikes as close to
home as the Fourth Amendment does; when the government’s
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 1777.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1784–85.
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ability to intrude into peoples’ lives is at stake, the conversation
becomes more about what type of society we want to live in, and less
about the one we actually live in. Professor Amsterdam said it best:
The ultimate question, plainly, is a value judgment. It is
whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by
the police is permitted to go unregulated by
constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and
freedom remaining to citizens would be diminished to a
compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open
society. That, in outright terms, is the judgment lurking
underneath the Supreme Court’s decision in Katz, and it
seems to me the judgment that the fourth amendment
inexorably requires the Court to make. But it is a
109
devastating question to put to a committee.
The right approach to conceptualizing the Fourth
Amendment involves making a value judgment about what is
necessary for our American idea of a free society. The underlying
value of the Fourth Amendment must be characterized as one of
individual autonomy rather than privacy. The language of the
amendment guarantees an individual’s right to be secure in their
person, houses, papers, or effects from unreasonable searches and
110
seizures. This implies a level of independent protection where
American citizens exist outside of the government’s authority or
111
influence. The difference between autonomy and privacy may be
considered by some to be “splitting hairs,” but using the concept of
privacy is problematic, as it comes with connotations of shielding
112
information and secrecy. Such connotations are not appropriate
in the context of the Fourth Amendment; they imply placing blame
on individuals for seeking to conceal information. Such
connotations also too easily lead to the idea that the Fourth

109. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 403.
110. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
111. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (“[The ideas
presented in Entick v. Carrington] reach further than the concrete form of the case
then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a
man’s home and the privacies of life.”).
112. See William Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1025–26 (1995) (“In other words, though privacy means many
things and though Fourth and Fifth Amendment law protect many interests, one
fairly well-defined and fairly narrow interest, the interest in secrecy, seems
predominant.”).
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Amendment should not extend to what people willingly expose to
the public, or third parties; after all, if you want protection for it,
113
you should have kept it “secret.”
A Fourth Amendment centered around safeguarding personal
autonomy would impart a greater level of power and control for
American citizens over the government: power to limit the
government’s access to information about us and control over
when and to whom we share the information, ideas, and projects
that characterize our independent lives. The Fourth Amendment
guarantees a right of the people because it is individual autonomy
that is necessary for any free and democratic society to flourish. As
Justice Robert Jackson noted, in his now famous and oft-quoted
Brinegar v. United States dissent:
These, I protest, are not mere second-class rights but
belong in the catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among
deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a
population, crushing the spirit of the individual and
putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search and
seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in
the arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need
only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a people
possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of
these rights to know that the human personality
deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where
homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to
114
unheralded search and seizure by the police.
It is the “dignity” and “self-reliance” of the people that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment; so long as the Court uses
such a narrow conceptualization of privacy as its basis for
determining when a search is reasonable, it will continue to fall
115
short of the amendment’s purpose.

113. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[W]hatever the societal expectations, they can attain
constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for privacy. I would not assume that all
information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited
purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
114. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–81 (1949).
115. See id.
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Interpreting the Minnesota Constitution

Although warrantless searches of garbage left out on the curb
have been deemed acceptable under the U.S. Constitution,
individual states can interpret their own constitutions to provide
116
greater protections than the Federal Constitution. Historically,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has favored uniformity with the
Federal Constitution and will not construe the Minnesota
Constitution as providing more protection than the Federal
117
Constitution, unless there is a “principled basis” to do so. The
Minnesota Supreme Court exercises particular restraint when the
text of the Minnesota Constitution and Federal Constitution are
118
textually identical.
“Article 1, Section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution [is]
textually identical to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
119
Constitution.” The Minnesota Supreme Court has interpreted the
Minnesota Constitution as awarding greater protections against
120
unreasonable searches and seizures in certain situations.

116. See State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 2015).
117. See Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005) (“[W]e
traditionally approach this task with restraint and some delicacy. Moreover, we will
not, on some slight implication and vague conjecture, depart from federal
precedent or the general principle that favors uniformity with the federal
constitution. But, when we reach a clear and strong conviction that there is a
principled basis for greater protection of the individual civil and political rights of
our citizens under the Minnesota Constitution, we will not hesitate to interpret the
constitution to independently safeguard those rights.”).
118. See State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97 (Minn. 1999) (“A decision of the
Supreme Court interpreting a provision of the U.S. Constitution that is identical
to a provision of the Minnesota Constitution is of persuasive authority to this
court.”).
119. State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199, 209 (Minn. 2005).
120. See State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 181 (Minn. 2007) (holding police dog
sniffing in hallway outside apartment requires reasonable articulate suspicion of
criminal activity); Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Minn.
1994) (holding that the Supreme Court allowing roadblocks to investigate driving
under the influence was a radical departure from the previous rule, and that
police need a reasonable articulate suspicion of wrongdoing before making
investigative stops in Minnesota); In re Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779, 781
(Minn. 1993) (rejecting the approach taken by the U.S. Supreme Court
concerning when a seizure occurs because the approach was a departure from
precedent and the court saw no reason to follow the departure).
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However, it has also consistently held that garbage set out for
121
collection can be searched without a warrant.
III. CASE DESCRIPTION
A.

Facts and Procedure

On January 25, 2012, a mandated reporter informed the
Hutchinson Police Department about the possible use of
controlled substances at David McMurray’s house in Hutchinson,
122
Minnesota. McMurray’s daughter saw her mother with something
123
that was believed to be a pipe used for drugs.
Upon finding that McMurray and his wife had previously been
arrested for drug violations, Officer Erlandson contacted the
commercial truck driver responsible for picking up McMurray’s
garbage and requested that McMurray’s garbage be put aside for a
124
police inspection. When searched, the officer found evidence of
illegal narcotics in the garbage and used this evidence as probable
125
cause to obtain a warrant to search McMurray’s house. Police
126
executed the warrant and found 3.3 grams of methamphetamine.
The state charged McMurray with a third-degree controlled
127
substance violation.
McMurray moved the district court to
suppress the evidence recovered from his home, contending that
the warrantless search of his garbage was unconstitutional under
128
Article 1, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution. The court
denied the motion, finding that McMurray had no expectation of
privacy for the garbage container he set out on the curb for
129
pickup. At trial, the court found McMurray guilty as charged and
130
sentenced him to twenty-four months in prison.
McMurray appealed, arguing that the district court committed
reversible error by denying his motion to suppress the evidence

121. See State v. Dreyer, 345 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. 1984); State v. Oquist,
327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1982).
122. State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 688 (Minn. 2015).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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recovered from his home, and the Minnesota Court of Appeals
131
affirmed. Finding that the expectation of privacy in a person’s
garbage is “eroded” when placed outside for pickup, the court of
appeals adhered to the Supreme Court’s holding in California v.
Greenwood, as well as its previous decisions, which hold the
Minnesota Constitution does not provide people with a reasonable
132
expectation of privacy in their garbage left out for pickup.
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review to decide
whether Article 1, Section 10, of the Minnesota Constitution offers
greater protection than the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution in the context of warrantless searches of
133
garbage set out publicly for collection.
McMurray argued that the Minnesota Constitution provides
citizens with an expectation of privacy in the contents of their
garbage because historically, the state constitutional provision has
protected broader expectations of privacy than the Fourth
134
Amendment. McMurray also argued that the significant personal
items that can be found in a person’s garbage indicate that
Minnesotans have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
135
contents of their garbage left out for collection.
The State countered that, because the Minnesota Supreme
Court favors uniformity with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
the Federal Constitution, it should follow the Supreme Court’s
decision in California v. Greenwood, where the Court held that there
is no expectation of privacy in discarded garbage left for collection
136
in an area accessible to the public.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there is
no principled basis to interpret Article 1, Section 10, of the
Minnesota Constitution to afford greater protection against
warrantless searches of garbage set out for collection than the
137
Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.

131. Id. at 689.
132. State v. McMurray, No. A12-2266, 2013 WL 5021206, at *3 (Minn. Ct.
App. Sept. 16, 2013).
133. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d. at 689.
134. Brief for Appellant at 6, McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686 (No. A12-2266).
135. Id. at 8.
136. Brief for Respondent at 4, McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686 (No. A12-2266)
(citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988)).
137. See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 694.
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The Rationale of the Minnesota Supreme Court Decision and Dissent

The majority first asserted that the Minnesota Supreme Court
will not construe the Minnesota Constitution to afford greater
rights than the U.S. Constitution, unless there is a “principled basis
138
to do so.” When the text of the Minnesota Constitution is
“materially identical” to the Federal Constitution, the court will
only construe the state constitution to provide greater protection if
139
one of three conditions exist. Because Article 1, Section 10, is
materially identical to the Fourth Amendment, the majority went
through those conditions to analyze whether there was a principled
140
basis to find greater rights in the state constitution.
First, the majority found that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Greenwood was not a radical departure from its Fourth Amendment
141
precedent. It was in line with the principles first articulated in
142
Katz. The majority accepted Greenwood’s reasoning that because
anyone can rummage through garbage on the curb, there is no
143
reasonable expectation of privacy in such garbage.
Second, the majority found that Greenwood did not retrench on
the Bill of Rights issue of protection against warrantless searches
because it was consistent with the decisions of most of the state
144
courts.
Third, the majority found that the Greenwood holding did not
fail to adequately protect basic rights or liberties of Minnesotans
because Minnesota does not have a long tradition of protecting
145
garbage set out for collection from a warrantless search. Instead,
the Minnesota Supreme Court has repeatedly held that garbage set
out for collection is not protected by the Fourth Amendment and
146
may be searched without a warrant.
Writing the dissenting opinion, Justice Lillehaug asserted that
Minnesotans do have an expectation of privacy when they put their

138. Id. at 690 (citing State v. Harris, 560 N.W.2d 90, 97–98 (Minn. 1999)).
139. Id. (citing Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 828 (Minn. 2005)).
140. See id. at 691–93.
141. See id.
142. Id. (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967)).
143. Id. (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 692.
146. See id. (citing State v. Dreyer, 345 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. 1984); State v.
Oquist, 327 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1982)).
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household waste in containers out on the curb for collection.
Justice Lillehaug argued that the Greenwood decision did not
adequately protect the rights and liberties of citizens of
148
Minnesota. Household waste contains an enormous amount of
personal information that—thanks to the digital era—contains
149
even more personal information than it used to. The dissent
warned that allowing police to search these containers without a
warrant, or even a reasonable articulable suspicion, gives the
government a green light to broaden and deepen its efforts to
150
acquire our most intimate information.
IV. ANALYSIS
In his dissent, Justice Lillehaug asserted that of the three
conditions allowing for the Minnesota Supreme Court to depart
from U.S. Supreme Court precedent, this case implicates the
thirdwhether the U.S. Supreme Court holding (here, in
California v. Greenwood) adequately protects the rights and liberties
151
of Minnesotans. This argument is persuasive but incomplete. This
note will argue that the first condition is implicated here as
wellwhether the U.S. Supreme Court made a sharp or radical
152
departure from its precedent in deciding Greenwood. The fact that
two out of three possible factors are raised by this issue,
demonstrates an even stronger principled basis for the Minnesota
Supreme Court to deviate from federal precedent, and by failing to
do so, the Minnesota Supreme Court failed in its duty as “the first
line of defense for individual liberties within the federalist
153
system.”
This section argues that California v. Greenwood was a radical
departure from precedent, warranting the Minnesota Supreme
154
Court to deviate from the Supreme Court’s Greenwood holding. It
will discuss McMurray’s implications for privacy in light of twenty155
first century technological and public policy changes. Finally, it
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 695 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
See id. at 697.
Id.
Id. at 702.
See id. at 697.
See id. at 691 (majority opinion); see infra Part IV. A.
State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn. 1985).
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.

10 (Do Not Delete)

378

3/24/2016 7:57 PM

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:353

will propose that a better holding would have been to require a
156
reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing for police to search garbage.
A.

The Greenwood Decision and Departing from Precedent

The majority in State v. McMurray quickly accepted the
reasoning of California v. Greenwood, foregoing an in-depth analysis
157
of the previous search and seizure precedent. However, upon a
closer analysis, Greenwood was a departure from precedent,
indicating a principled basis for interpreting the Minnesota
158
Constitution differently than the Fourth Amendment.
The
majority erred by dismissing this factor and deciding McMurray
159
based on the reasoning of California v. Greenwood.
The majority asserted that Greenwood was in-line with the
principles established by Katz: (1) that a person can invoke the
protections of the Fourth Amendment if she has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the area or items searched; and (2) what a
person knowingly exposes to the public is not subject to Fourth
160
Amendment protection. The majority fell back on the reasoning
that because all sorts of people and animals can rummage through
garbage once it is set out on the curb, society does not reasonably
161
expect the contents of garbage to remain private. The majority
failed to further analyze the reasoning behind the Greenwood
162
holding.
However, just as the U.S. Supreme Court has conveniently
managed to do repeatedly, the majority in McMurray ignored the
163
other essential principle established in Katz v. United States. It is
true that what a person knowingly exposes to the public is not a
subject of Fourth Amendment protection, “[b]ut what he seeks to

156. See infra Part IV.C.
157. See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 691.
158. Compare California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988) (holding that by
the defendant exposing his garbage to the public, he relinquished his rights to
Fourth Amendment protection), with Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351
(1967) (maintaining that what a person exposes to the public is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment, “[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”).
159. See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 697–98 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 691 (majority opinion).
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. See id.; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
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preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
164
Of course people expose their
constitutionally protected.”
garbage to the public to conform with basic sanitation norms and
ordinances, but most people also put their household waste in
opaque bags, and then put those bags in containers with closed
165
lids. These efforts demonstrate that people, knowing the vast
amounts of personal information contained in garbage, actually do
166
seek to preserve the privacy of their garbage.
The Supreme Court of Vermont came to this same conclusion
167
in State v. Morris,
where it refused to follow the Greenwood
precedent and held that there is a privacy expectation in garbage
168
left out for collection. The court reasoned that the possibility of
animals or humans scavenging through garbage does not negate
the expectation of privacy in such garbage “any more than the
possibility of a burglary or break-ins negates an expectation of
169
privacy in one’s home . . . .” The California, Hawaii, New Jersey,
and Washington state supreme courts have also refused to accept
Greenwood’s reasoning, finding warrantless searches of garbage
170
unconstitutional.
In doing so, these courts have recognized what the Minnesota
Supreme Court has refused to: that since Katz, the Supreme Court
has applied an unnecessarily formalistic approach to
privacywhich is neither in line with the spirit of Katz, nor with the
spirit of the Fourth Amendmentwhere people forfeit their rights
to be protected from government intrusion simply because they
171
“choose” to expose themselves or their property to others. As our
164. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
165. See McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 699 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting) (“Not only is
household waste different than it was when Greenwood was decided, so are the bags
and special containers into which the waste is placed for pickup or recycling. Like
the City of Hutchinson, many municipalities now require closed, vermin-proof
containers.”).
166. See id. at 697.
167. 680 A.2d 90 (Vt. 1996).
168. See id. at 93.
169. Id. at 99.
170. See People v. Krivda, 486 P.2d 1262, 1264 (Cal. 1971); State v. Tanaka,
701 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Haw. 1985); State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 803 (N.J. 1990);
State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112, 1117 (Wash. 1990).
171. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 216 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he Court today . . . departs significantly from the standard developed in Katz
for deciding when a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred . . . .”); Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding function of the Fourth
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world grows smaller, with technology facilitating an unprecedented
ease of communication, this third-party doctrine will prove to be
increasingly irrelevant and unsustainable. Even in the smallest
towns across America, people typically have no choice but to
communicate and interact with third-party intermediaries, which
then leaves aspects of their private lives unprotected by the Fourth
172
Amendment.
California v. Greenwood’s departure from the principles
embodied in Katz should have induced the court in State v.
173
McMurray to deviate from Supreme Court precedent. Instead, the
Minnesota Supreme Court accepted an unpersuasive decision that
succumbed to the pressure of enhancing law enforcement
capabilities over protecting the right of the people to live free from
174
unreasonable government interference.

Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted
intrusion by the State.”); see also State v. Morris, 680 A.2d 90, 116 (Vt. 1996)
(“[U]nconstrained government inspection of people’s trash is not consistent with
a free and open society.”).
172. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 80, at 130 (“Only a hermit can lay claim to
complete secrecy. For anyone who wishes to inhabit the world, daily life inevitably
involves personal associations and the information we exchange within them . . . .
To insist that information is private only when it remains completely secret is
preposterous.”).
173. See State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 690 (Minn. 2015).
174. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 55 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“In holding that the warrantless search of Greenwood’s trash was
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, the Court paints a grim picture of our
society. It depicts a society in which local authorities may command their citizens
to dispose of their personal effects in the manner least protective of the ‘sanctity of
[the] home and the privacies of life,’ and then monitor them arbitrarily and
without judicial oversight . . . .” (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 635 (1989)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Precisely because the need for action against the drug
scourge is manifest, the need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great.
History teaches that grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when
constitutional rights seem too extravagant to endure. The World War II relocationcamp cases . . . and the Red scare and McCarthy–era internal subversion cases . . .
are only the most extreme reminders that when we allow fundamental freedoms to
be sacrificed in the name of real or perceived exigency, we invariably come to
regret it.”).
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McMurray’s Implications for Privacy and Policy
1.

Technological Implications for Privacy

As Justice Lillehaug states in his McMurray dissent, since the
Greenwood decision, the nature of household waste has changed:
175
“this is not your grandfather’s garbage.” The State v. McMurray
holding presents significant public policy concerns; one of them
being the effects new technology will have for disposing of, and
searching through, people’s garbage. This concern has two
components: (1) there is increased probability of people disposing
of technological devices that contain vast amounts of personal
information, and (2) law enforcement has greater access to
176
technology that allows increasingly thorough forensic analysis.
Although most people are encouraged by their local
governments to dispose of electronic devices like TV’s and
computers at specified recycling sites, small digital devices like
flash-drives or computer disks often find themselves in the trash.
Even if a privacy-aware homeowner takes care not to throw away
any digital devices, electronic sensors and data-collectors are now
present in a wide variety of consumer products that someone might
177
not even be aware of the need to recycle or data-destroy. For
example, sales of personal fitness monitoring devices, such as
Fitbit™ and the Nike+FuelBand™, have exploded over the past two
years and track personal information such as the number of steps
its user has taken, the amount of calories its user has burned, and
178
the distance its user has travelled. The average person is likely
savvy enough to know not to throw away a computer, tablet, or
smartphone, understanding the personal information contained
on the hard drive, but in this new “internet of things,” many people
might not realize how much information seemingly simple
products can collect about their owners, or how to properly dispose
of such products. Local governments typically post information on
how to recycle electronics, but it is an individual’s responsibility to

175. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d at 697 (Lillehaug, J., dissenting).
176. See id.
177. See generally Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85,
87–92 (2014) (explaining the proliferation of data-collecting consumer devices
and the implications for privacy).
178. See id. at 101.
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179

wipe data from such items. Moreover, not having fully caught up
with the growth of data collecting products, community recycling
guides generally do not inform community members of the need to
wipe data from products such as fitness monitoring bands or bio180
tracking clothing.
In deciding that Minnesotans have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb, the
Minnesota Supreme Court is opening the door for not only police
but also third-parties to collect personal data from these types of
products that unsuspecting Minnesotans might throw away.
In addition to people owning, and consequently disposing of,
a wider range of devices holding personal data, in the years since
Greenwood, significant technological advances have been made in
law enforcement’s ability to test and analyze biological waste. The
people who are cognizant of the personal data contained on their
various devices know not to throw any of them away without at least
wiping their data. Those same people are still producing biological
waste in the course of their everyday lives, which invariably ends up
in the trash. If one thing has not changed since Greenwood, it is that
“almost every human activity ultimately manifests itself in waste
181
products.” And as Justice Lillehaug notes, “[i]nvestigative tools
are much more sophisticated and their probing capacity now
extends well beyond the curtilage. For example, law enforcement
now has the ability to test—easily and economically—the DNA that
182
can be gleaned from all manner of waste.” Although there are
limitations imposed by Congress and state legislatures for collecting
DNA and DNA databanking, “[i]n general, Congress has taken a
supportive attitude toward DNA databanking and incentivized the
183
development, expansion, and integration of DNA databases.”
Allowing police to examine people’s garbage without a warrant
comes with the dangerous possibility that DNA may be collected
179. See Data Privacy Information, RAMSEY CTY., https://ramseyatoz.co.ramsey
.mn.us/Pages/ItemDetails.aspx?ItemID=159&ItemTitle=Data%20Privacy
%20Information (last updated Aug. 30, 2013).
180. See What Is Electronic Waste or E-Waste, RAMSEY CTY., https://ramseyatoz.co
.ramsey.mn.us/Pages/Electronics.aspx?Category=Electronics&CategoryID=2 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2016).
181. Smith v. State, 510 P.2d 793, 798 (Alaska 1973) (holding warrantless
searches of garbage constitutional).
182. State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 698 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J.,
dissenting).
183. EMILY C. BARBOUR, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: IMPLICATIONS OF
TECHNOLOGICAL SHIFTS AND SELECTED TRENDS 80 (Lucille E. Huff ed., 2014).
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and stored, constituting a truly astonishing level of governmental
interference with the personal autonomy of private citizens that is
altogether unheard of.
2.

Public Policy Implications

Technological innovations since California v. Greenwood have
increased the depth of information that can be found in, and
extracted from, one’s garbage. However, societal changes have
occurred in the United States as well; the year 2015 has witnessed
re-invigorated conversations about issues such as racism, crime, and
imprisonment in the United States—issues which, as it has become
184
increasingly apparent, have yet to be resolved. It has become
increasingly obvious, particularly as we have observed the long-term
effects of the “war on drugs,” that some of our previous approaches
to crime and law enforcement have not lived up to expectations.
Consequently, there are serious policy implications to consider
when accepting the reasoning of a case decided in 1988.
The holding in Greenwood was published at the height of
America’s war on drugs, when drug abuse was deemed “public
enemy number one,” and prosecuting individuals involved in the
185
drug trade was pursued at almost any cost. As a result, arresting
drug users and dealers became the motive behind most of the
warrantless searches of garbage executed by police across the
United States and had a significant impact on American search and
186
seizure jurisprudence. Lower courts in the eighties and nineties
184. See generally Ben Collins, The War on Drugs Is Over (If You Want It), DAILY
BEAST (May 8, 2015, 5:08 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/08
/the-war-on-drugs-is-over-if-you-want-it.html; Lindsey Cook, No, Justice is Not
Colorblind, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 11, 2014, 10:15 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news
/blogs/data-mine/2014/12/11/no-justice-is-not-colorblind; Steven W. Hawkins,
The Conversation on U.S. Prisons We Should Be Having, HUFFINGTON POST (July 18,
2015, 11:59 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/steven-w-hawkins /criminalinjustice-the-co_b_7824086.html.
185. See Claire Suddath, The War on Drugs, TIME (Mar. 25, 2009),
http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1887488,00.html; see also
Charles Patrick Garcia, Note, The Knock and Announce Rule: A New Approach to the
Destruction-of-Evidence Exception, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 685, 712 (1993) (“When the civil
rights of citizens suspected of drug dealing are involved, society has a strong
tendency to abandon cherished liberties enumerated in the Bill of Rights in its
effort to win the ‘War on Drugs.’”).
186. See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War
on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1389, 1410 (1993) (“[T]he war on drugs has led to new
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made frequent, and often scathing, references to the war on drugs,
187
which the Supreme Court usually failed to reciprocate. As John
Wesley Hall Jr. astutely noted, “the politics of the ‘war on drugs’ has
188
stretched the Fourth Amendment to its limits.” This is more than
slightly reminiscent of the early twentieth century holdings from
Olmstead and Hester, where prohibition created a justification for
enlarging the police power in the name of stamping out alcohol
189
abuse, and the Fourth Amendment suffered its first blow.
However, it is now 2015, and public policy has largely shifted
away from the war on drugs, with more people questioning its
190
effectiveness than ever before. Numerous critics now frequently
point to the United States’ overflowing prison population—the
result of harsh and indefensible criminal penalties for drug
offenses—as one of the most unfortunate and unintended
consequences of the war on drugs, although the criticisms range
191
much further than that.
Allowing police to search through

interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and the rules for search and seizure.
Zealous law enforcement officials are inclined to stretch the limits of the
Constitution in their desire to win the war they are fighting.”).
187. Compare United States v. Lewis, 728 F. Supp. 784, 789 (D.D.C. 1990) (“In
this ‘anything goes’ war on drugs, random knocks on the doors of our citizens’
homes seeking ‘consent’ to search for drugs cannot be far away. This is not
America.”), with Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 440–44 (1991) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (“Our Nation, we are told, is engaged in a ‘war on drugs.’ No one
disputes that it is the job of law-enforcement officials to devise effective weapons
for fighting this war. But the effectiveness of a law-enforcement technique is not
proof of its constitutionality. . . . The majority suggests that this latest tactic in the
drug war is perfectly compatible with the Constitution. I disagree.”).
188. HALL, supra note 13, at 33–34.
189. Sundby, supra note 64, at 1755 (“In 1928, at a time when the courts were
facing a wave of Prohibition Act cases not unlike the current flood of cases
resulting from the war on drugs, the Court confronted a situation where federal
prohibition officers had placed wiretaps on the phones of a suspected bootlegging
ring without any pretense of obtaining a warrant. Adhering to a very literal
reading of the Fourth Amendment, the Court in Olmstead v. United States held that
the Amendment’s protections did not apply because the placing of the wiretaps
had not required the officers to physically trespass upon the defendants’
premises.”).
190. See Maia Szalavitz, Viewpoint: How Marijuana Decision Could Signal Turning
Point in the U.S. War on Drugs, TIME (Aug. 29, 2013), http://healthland.time.com
/2013/08/29/viewpoint-how-marijuana-decision-could-signal-turning-point-in-the
-u-s-war-on-drugs (tracing how the recent voter referendums in Colorado and
Washington indicate a turning point in the war on drugs).
191. See generally Mathew A. Christiansen, A Great Schism: Social Norms and
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garbage for evidence of drug use may have been deemed a
reasonable display of police power in 1988, when the war on drugs
was considered worthy of aggressive pursuit. However, after almost
thirty years, it is clear the war is lost and we need to start looking
back at some of the restrictions placed on the Fourth Amendment
in the name of the doomed and destructive war on drugs. Is
intruding upon an individual’s personal autonomy really worth it
just to put another drug user in prison? With State v. McMurray, the
Minnesota Supreme Court had an opportunity to revisit these
policy considerations and steer Minnesota in the direction that the
public is already headed; instead, the court fell in line with a dying
policy that has failed to live up to the spirit of the Fourth
Amendment and the values of this country.
C.

An Alternative: Requiring a Reasonable Articulable Suspicion

Instead of broadly holding that Minnesotans have no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb, the
majority should have held that a warrantless search of garbage is
unlawful without at least a reasonably articulable suspicion that the
garbage contains evidence of a crime. The supreme courts of
Alaska, Indiana, and Montana have adopted this standard, which
recognizes that people have some expectation of privacy in their
garbage that prevents random searches but allows police to search
192
without probable cause. This standard finds a middle ground
between protecting individual liberties, and allowing the police to
193
effectively do their job.

Marijuana Prohibition, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 229, 230 (2010) (arguing that
prohibitions against marijuana use have not fulfilled their goals and it would be
economically productive to fall in line with the social norm of marijuana use);
Andrew D. Black, Note,“The War on People”: Reframing “The War on Drugs” by
Addressing Racism within American Drug Policy Through Restorative Justice and
Community Collaboration, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 177, 178–79 (2007); Ben WallaceWells, How America Lost the War on Drugs, ROLLING STONE (Mar. 24, 2011),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/how-america-lost-the-war-on-drugs
-20110324.
192. See Beltz v. State, 221 P.3d 328, 336 (Alaska 2009); Litchfield v. State, 824
N.E.2d 356, 364 (Ind. 2005); State v. 1993 Chevrolet Pickup, 116 P.3d 800, 805
(Mont. 2005).
193. Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 364 (“[A] requirement of articulable
individualized suspicion . . . imposes the appropriate balance between the privacy
interests of citizens and the needs of law enforcement.”).
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V. CONCLUSION
In State v. McMurray, the Minnesota Supreme Court was asked
to interpret the Minnesota Constitution to provide greater
protection than the Fourth Amendment in the context of
194
warrantless searches of garbage left out for collection. The court
adhered to Supreme Court precedent and found that there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left on the curb;
195
therefore, there is no constitutional protection for it.
The
majority failed to fully analyze the extent to which California v.
Greenwood was a radical departure from the values expressed in past
precedent, missing a valid opportunity to deviate from case law that
fails to protect, or even articulate, a clear and legitimate interest
196
underlying the principles of the Fourth Amendment. Without
even requiring a reasonably articulable suspicion of wrongdoing,
McMurray potentially allows continued, significant government
invasion on individual autonomy.

194.
195.
196.

State v. McMurray, 860 N.W.2d 686, 687 (Minn. 2015).
Id. at 694–95 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)).
Id. at 693.

